Here’s a topic dear to my heart. (Go, Pack, Go!) Frankly, some of the “culture of winning” in Green Bay comes from its history and tradition, and it’s not necessarily something easy to replicate. In fact, the Packers went through a long dry spell (about 20 years) during which the “culture of winning” was absent. So any organization trying to capture this attitude (or recapture it) can’t just rely on past glories.

One of the unspoken keys to the Packers’ organizational strength right now is the sense of “ownership” (both real and intangible) by all of the stakeholders — fans, players, team leaders, the community. The Packers have a unique business model as a publicly owned team with thousands of shareholders, but it’s an attitude that many other organizations — retail or otherwise — should aspire to. In short, make sure that your executives, hourly associates, customers, vendors and other stakeholders are literally or figuratively “invested” in the success of the business.

Selling unique, exclusive merchandise has been part of the Target formula for a long time, and this venture is certainly true to the brand position. It moves Target further away from the pure price-and-commodity positioning of the past couple of years (complete with its own mini-dollar store at the entrance).

But there are a couple of cautions for Target to consider: First, can the company forecast demand (and execute) more accurately than with some of its recent missteps like Missoni? Second, do “the Shops” truly reinforce Target’s value position, not just the “coolness factor”? If Target can succeed on both fronts, this looks like a winning idea.

It’s obviously a period of uncertainty for Urban, not just because of its recent sales performance but also because of a failed transition at the top of the company. It’s also hard to say whether Mr. Hayne (the founder and former CEO of the company) is in place as a transitional figure before turning over the reins, or plans to stick around for awhile.

We’ve seen this sequence of events in many other companies: The founder can’t find a suitable successor, or he is unwilling to walk away. Without knowing the internal politics at URBN, it’s clear that the company is losing share in an environment where many other junior/trend retailers are doing well.

This looks like a win for both companies. There is nothing in the joint history of Apple and Target to suggest that a better in-store presentation will tarnish the brand. (After all, the product is already there and Target is not discounting it.) Provided that Target can execute close to the service standard of the Apple Store (maybe not complete with a Genius Bar), it’s a good way to expand Apple’s distribution in a controlled way.

While it’s not likely that Best Buy planned some sort of “bait and switch” maneuver, it leaves a disagreeable taste in its customers’ mouths. This is a failure on so many fronts: The worst offense is the lag time between order placement and cancellation. (At least Best Buy acknowledged this problem.) But it’s almost as negligent for Best Buy to have accepted orders in the first place — at narrow gross margins — that it was unprepared to fill.

Is the company’s inventory forecasting or IT management that bad? (Perhaps Best Buy hired the person that mismanaged the Missoni launch at Target in September.) An online apology and gift card is not going to rebuild trust in Best Buy anytime soon.

General merchandisers have succeeded through the years with either EDLP or high/low promotional strategies, so there is more than one option for food retailers too. However, it’s too simple to say that promo pricing is “the answer,” because it depends on a variety of factors:

1. Which pricing tactics are more appropriate to your overall brand strategy as a food retailer?

2. Does your specific competitive situation really allow you to be priced higher than EDLP food retailers?

3. Is your customer likely to wait for sales, cherry-pick promoted items and do most of her grocery shopping elsewhere?

I’d suggest a market-basket analysis to provide some empirical evidence one way or the other on this issue, but there is likely to be a valid argument on both sides.

I hope that the Sears in my neighborhood is on the list of store closings, so that the site (part of an otherwise thriving “lifestyle center”) can be re-purposed for a stronger mall anchor. The lack of any investment in this store, while everything around it was remodeled or rethought about five years ago, is emblematic of how Sears Holdings has mismanaged its best asset: its physical stores. How about replacing burned-out light bulbs, or a fresh coat of paint?

Everyone knows that Lou D’Ambrosio is not the real CEO of Sears Holdings, and that Ed Lampert calls the shots. So the “clarity of where we are taking the company,” as Mr. D’Ambrosio puts it, is as clear as mud. As long as the company’s cash position declines along with its comp sales, this becomes a more difficult problem to solve.

As Mr. Potter said to George Bailey, “You’re worth more dead than alive!” At some point Sears Holdings will throw in the towel and recognize that its most valuable assets are its brands and its real estate. Until then, we will all continue to witness the death throes of a $40 billion company.

The annual stories about “excessive discounting” leading to lower margins remind me of the old Mark Twain quotation: “The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated.” After all, if sharper promotions and lower prices were unsustainable, Walmart wouldn’t be the world’s largest company.

It’s important to look at promotional activity and discounted prices in the context of an overall strategy:

1. What other supply chain and sourcing savings have gone into the products being discounted most sharply?

2. Is the merchandise exclusive to that retailer, and therefore less subject to pricing wars?

3. Is the retailer managing its inventory levels appropriately, on a macro level as well as on a store-by-store basis?

Over time, most retailers are showing gradual improvements in margins at the same time as their promotional cadence gets more intense. The biggest stumbles this year will come from the stores who headed into the 4th quarter with excessive inventory, not necessarily the ones with planned but aggressive sales promotions.

I actually see a disconnect between consumers’ response to a survey and their actual behavior. It’s the same syndrome that leads consumers to tell somebody that they plan to spend less for holiday this year, then go out and shop at a modestly higher rate. Pay attention to facts and results, not stated intentions.

If consumers were truly suffering from “gadget fatigue,” would they line up to buy the latest iteration of the iPhone? Would Apple and Amazon be selling tablets at such a fast pace? Fatigue (a.k.a. poor sales) tends to set in when a tech marketer launches an inferior product, with the BlackBerry Playbook being a prime example in 2011.

Is the return problem centered on high end electronics and tech gear, or on apparel? It’s important to have the answer before developing a solution. If the former, it’s correct that sales associate should make sure the consumer understands how something works before the register is rung. (We all know from personal experience that this doesn’t always happen.) But clearly there is a correlation between tighter household budgets and higher return rates, so the trend may not improve until the economy is on firmer footing.

At the same time, stores should view liberal return policies as a positive way to drive business, not a negative cost. There is no doubt that retailers with “no hassle” programs have used them as a marketing tool and loyalty driver. Like almost everything else in retail, returns are expressed as a percentage of top line sales…so it’s important to drive those sales with a variety of tactics and policies.